Ismail Royer, a member of the Virginia jihad network and convicted for his links with LeT, served his sentence, and is now with Religious Freedom Institute, trying to retrace his old hardline position. But he still has a special place for LeT, distinguishing it from al-Qaeda. ‘I liked the folks in LeT. I had been very opposed to Bin Laden. I thought al-Qaeda was a group of deviants,’ he had said after his release from prison in January 2023.
At one level, it may just seem to be another point of view. But, for India, when it looks at it from the context of Royer’s appointment to a White House body, it signals a reversal of decades-long India-US anti-terror cooperation that brought LeT into al-Qaeda’s tent by designating it under the 1267 UN al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee. And, now, there’s resistance even within the UNSC to name The Resistance Front (TRF) for the Pahalgam terror attack, let alone accept linkages with LeT.
Clearly, deep state priorities driven by a new Cold War mindset have taken root, where there’s a loosening of controls over doing business with terror groups, their handlers and sponsors. Back in the 1970s, that’s exactly how mujahideen groups were fostered by the US with the help of the Pakistani deep state – ISI’s crowning moment – to take on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Two decades later, it came to bite the US. Just over two decades after 9/11, the lesson appears to have been forgotten.
The anti-terror consensus is now giving way to a new version of the Great Game. Which is why India must up its engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. If Trump can shake hands with Julani and talk of waiving sanctions on Syria, cosy up to Turkiye and let his family acolytes do business with the Pakistani army and Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, then political engagement with the Taliban is now a security necessity for New Delhi.
Significance of S Jaishankar’s telephonic conversation with his Afghan counterpart Amir Khan Muttaqi, thanking him for Kabul’s support following the Pahalgam attack, also points to different kind of new normal. The Taliban regime came out promptly to refute Pakistan’s claims in the middle of Operation Sindoor that an Indian rocket had hit Afghanistan.
India’s engagement with Afghanistan was so far restricted to official- level deliberations. Now that there has been a political reach-out, physical meetings at the political level may follow. The Taliban regime has been looking for political recognition, which Pakistan has sought to block with support from the US and other Western countries.
As a non-permanent UNSC member, Pakistan is also canvassing hard to become the ‘penholder’ on Afghanistan in UNSC with the purpose of discrediting the regime in Kabul. It also wants to be part of 1988 UN Taliban Sanctions Committee, which decides on periodic exemptions for leaders in Kabul to freely travel and operate funds.
But Islamabad’s hostile relationship with the Taliban, since the withdrawal of Nato troops, has nullified its military doctrine of using Afghanistan as ‘strategic depth’ in a conventional conflict with India. Conversely, it may have opened a rare opportunity for India to turn it into a ‘strategic pincer’ on Pakistan.
Yes, games are afoot. China as principal weapons supplier to Pakistan is looking to corner mines in Afghanistan, but has a big Baloch problem that continues to target Sino-Pak interests in the region. Access to Gwadar port has also been hit, its viability also now in question with India and Iran finding ways to take forward the Chabahar project with benefits to Afghanistan. The Biden regime had given exemption to the project from Iran sanctions. Trump wants it reviewed afresh.
The US deep state has stepped up its outreach in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar by finding new pathways of support within the Trump establishment. Hopes have revived in Islamabad that it can once again aspire to position itself as a conduit between Washington and Beijing through a complex web of intelligence and military games. For India, however, it’s the entry of an unfriendly Turkiye into the equation that could get worrying, given how Trump is resetting the dial with Recep Erdogan.
Amid all this, the already stressed UN system now runs the risk of witnessing its carefully-crafted anti-terror frame crack. Technical teams of UN terror sanction regimes are viewing proposals first from a national perspective, then stalling with questions over ‘merit of evidence’, just like Pakistan and China have always wanted. As a result, the entire edifice is on test, unable to leverage its own value effectively, let alone create pressure.
A chaotic security situation is likely to play out with non-state actors finding active state sponsors and, therefore, a route to legitimacy. Dangerous as this mix is, it’s vital for India to protect, project and advance its economic interests with the US, EU and Quad, knowing that these would still be the best stakes to build in a play that has not only reached its neighbourhood, but could well surpass the extent of the original Great Game.
