Consider the logic to such laddering up. It is premised on the assumption among Indian military planners that there is sufficient room for conventional action under the nuclear umbrella. With each operation, the headroom available has been explored just that much more – from POK to Pakistan’s frontier regions to the heartland of Punjab. India has enhanced its appetite for (calculated) risk.
For Pakistan, the compulsion to hit back and the need to save face domestically was higher after Balakot than after the POK surgical strike. It is still higher after multiple assaults in the core province of Punjab. Critical infrastructure of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has been destroyed. These are the two Islamist groups perhaps closest to the Pakistani state.
A few weeks ago, in an incendiary speech that some interpreted as a precursor to the Pahalgam attack, Pakistani army chief Asim Munir referred to Kashmir as his country’s ‘jugular vein’. There was a bit of exaggeration here. For Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Kashmir remains a useful war zone – to train terrorists (in POK), or deploy them (across the LoC).
Terror has traditionally been a commodity for export, to India and Afghanistan, among others. Relatively distant – in minds, if not miles – POK and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa served as conflict campuses. Punjab, so central to the Pakistani army’s self-identity and vanity, was the sanctuary: a core protected by manipulated peripheries.India’s missile strikes have messaged that Punjab – the Pakistan army’s genuine jugular vein – is no longer invulnerable. Pressure on Munir is now that much greater. It is worth recalling 1965, a year when the Pakistani army’s braggadocio and bravado led it to launch two separate invasions of India.Morale turned when India began an audacious counterattack and took the war into Pakistani Punjab, into the very villages of Pakistani generals and soldiers, and to the outskirts of Lahore. Pakistan lost its nerve. Threat perception was suddenly incalculable – and personal.
Such thinking will influence responses in 2025 as well. Given this, in the short term, escalation, before any ultimate de-escalation, is a strong likelihood. In a longer reckoning, the Pakistani military and civilian leadership will have to live with enhanced unpredictability and realisation that no part of their country – not even beloved Punjab – is off limits should New Delhi believe an incursion is necessary.
The possibility of external powers interceding to bail out Pakistan remains. Nevertheless, three factors constrict this:
India’s growing diplomatic space because of its strategic and economic engagement with major regional and Western actors.
China’s wariness about getting directly involved.
Pakistan’s own choices in the larger politics of the Muslim world. That an early statement of support came from distant Turkiye rather than the UAE or Saudi Arabia is not inconsequential.
Just as India’s military answer to Pahalgam has crossed a certain threshold, so has its non-military answer. Whatever the time frame, the fact is the dismantling – or, at least severe alternation – of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has now commenced.
True, it is not a quick or easy process. Dams and storage mechanisms to keep the waters within India cannot be built overnight. However, an irreversible journey has likely been inaugurated. It will be difficult for any future government in India to completely reverse course without inviting serious public interrogation.
There is a larger generational issue at play here. Some 65% of India’s people are below the age of 35. Narendra Modi himself is the first Indian PM born after 1947. He was in his early teens when the 1965 war broke out. Since then, no Indian has known normal and regular trade or tourism exchanges, or even everyday engagement, with Pakistan. When these have taken place, they have been special, one-off interludes: Vajpayee’s bus journey (1999), the 2004 cricket series, the odd literary festival.
Much of this – especially the throttling of trade – has happened due to Pakistan’s conscious decisions. Rather than moderating truculence and recognising the intricate nature of subcontinental interdependencies, Pakistan’s elites have chosen to package themselves for one superpower or the other.
Today, they self-identify as culturally West Asian and economically a fringe extension of China’s Western Development Programme. They have rejected the subcontinent. After May 7, and following the rethinking on the Indus waters, India has returned the favour. Pahalgam could well be a Rubicon moment.
